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AUGUSTINE ON THE MIND'S SEARCH FOR ITSELF
Gareth B. Matthews
In De trinitate X Augustine seeks to discover the nature of mind (mens). As if
recalling Plato's Paradox of Inquiry, he wonders how such a search can be
coherently understood. Rejecting the idea that the mind knows itself only indi-
rectly, or partially, or by description, he insists that nothing is so present to the
mind as itself. Yet it is open to the mind to perfect its knowledge of itself by
coming to realize that its nature is to be only what it is certain that it iso
Augustine may never have read Plato's dialogue, Meno. We can't be sure.
He certainly knew about the dialogue. Specifically, he knew of the episode
in which Socrates questions the slave boy about how to construct a square
with an area twice that of a given square. But he may have gotten the
slave-boy story from Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (1.24.57). Perhaps he
never actually read Plato's dialogue itself and, in particular, never read the
brief passage in which first Meno, and then Socrates, states the Paradox of
Inquiry. (Meno BOde)
Nevertheless, the Paradox of Inquiry, however Augustine may have
come to think about it, engaged his mind in deep, fundamental, and per-
sisting ways. We can see this, for example, at the very beginning of his
Confessions, where he puzzles over whether one can pray that one may
come to know God. l Plato's Meno had been puzzled about how one could
aim one's search for the nature of virtue, or even recognize that nature if
one should happen to stumble across it, if one didn't already know the
nature of virtue. Similarly, Augustine asks how one know which being to
address one's prayer to, unless one already knows God.
We might think it only an idle worry that a seeker after God could actu-
ally pray to the wrong being for help in the search for God - either by
praying to a completely umeal being or, perhaps, by praying to a diaboli-
cal being instead of the good being one had hoped to make contact with.
But we should remember that Augustine himself had been a Manichean
learner not many years before he admitted to this puzzlement. After his
conversion to Christianity he must have viewed his earlier Manichean
prayers as misdirected entreaties of the very sort that he brings up at the
beginning of the Confessions.
Although I think it would be interesting and worthwhile to tease out the
exact form this theological version of the Paradox of Inquiry takes, and the
significance it has for Augustine, what I want to foeus on in this paper is a
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much more extensive discussion of the paradox than anything we can find
anywhere in the ConJessions. It is the discussion in Book X of Augustine's
Oe trinitate. That discussion is, to my knowledge, the fullest response to the
Paradox of Inquiry to be found in all of ancient and medieval philosophy.
It is the Paradox of Inquiry, in fact, that gives structure to Book X of the
Oe trinitate. Given its central importance to the book, it is surprising that
Augustine never actually states the Paradox of Inquiry in Book X, at least
not in any straightforward way. His stated project in that book is rather to
continue the effort to understand the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, the
idea that God is three-in-one. In Book X specifically he tries to illuminate
the Doctrine of the Trinity by finding an analogy to it in the human mind.
But before he can do that, he needs to say something about the mind -
about what a mind is, about how one has knowledge of one's mind and
knows that it is, in fact, a mind. Augustine thinks that even before he can
do that he needs to discuss inquiry more generally.
50 Augustine begins Book X of the Oe trinitate by stating a rather
intriguing principle. "No one," he writes, "can in any way love a thing that
is wholly unknown,"2 (rem prorsus ignoratam amare omnino nullus potest -
DT 10.1.1) We are not told at first how this principle, which I shall the
Knowledge Requirement Jor Love, will be relevant to the discussion to follow.
But we are not kept in suspense for very longe Augustine directs our atten-
tion to the love of students who, by virtue of being only students, lack the
knowledge they are seeking and thus, by the Knowledge Requirement,
cannot love it. Being unable to love the object of their inquiry, these stu-
dents cannot be motivated in their inquiry by a love of that which they
want to know. Being unmotivated, they won't inquire. But being students,
they do. 50 here we have a somewhat augmented version of Plato's
Paradox of Inql.liry. If we were to make explicit the version of the paradox
that Augustine puts in play here, we might come up with this:
Motivational Paradox oflnquiry (MPl)
Consider some inquirer, 5, and some object of inquiry, O.
1. 5 won't search for 0 unless 5 loves O. (Motivational Assumption)
2. 5 can't love 0 unless 5 already knows O. (Knowledge
Requirement)
3. If 5 already knows 0, then 5 can't search for o. [because 5 does
not lack knowledge of 0].
4. Either 5 already knows 0 or 5 doesn't already know O. (tautology)
5. If 5 doesn't already know 0, then 5 can't love O. (2, transposi-
tion)
6. If 5 doesn't love 0, then 5 won't search for O. (I, transposition)
7. If 5 doesn't already know 0, then 5 won't search for 0, (5, 6, h.s.)
8. Either 5 can't search for 0 or 5 won't search for O. (3, 4, 7, c.d.)
We should admit right away that the Motivational Paradox of Inquiry
(MPI), as I have reconstructed it here, is far too simplistic to capture the
structure of real inquiry, at least for very many of the cases of inquiry that
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we are likely to be interested in. As we shall see, it is a major burden of
Augustine's discussion to bring out how much more complex, and how
much more interesting, real cases of inquiry are than the MPI might lead
us to suppose.
Perhaps the structure of the MPI, as I have schematized it, most natural-
ly fits cases of inquiry relevantly like searching for a missing person. But
even in such a case there are problems. My younger brother, as a four-
year-old, went with his best friend on a totally unauthorized, but partly for
that reason quite exciting, expedition into the woods. Various family mem-
bers, friends, and other concemed citizens of our town soon formed search
parties to look for the two children. Even the local "civil air patrol" got into
the acL Certainly the searchers were highly motivated to conduct their
search. For some of them that motivation did indeed arise from a love for
my brother, or for his friend. Yet there were many searchers, the pilot of
the search plane, for example, who could hardly be said to have loved my
brother or his friend, whom they had never even heard of before. The
searchers are thus counterexamples to the Motivational Assumption. As
we shall see, Augustine hirnself recognizes this sort of objection in his dis-
cussion of tl'le MPI.
There is, however, another sort of objection to the Motivational
Assumption that needs to be addressed. Suppose that, instead of there
being a search for two relatively innocent little boys, there had been a
search for escaped convicts. In that case it would be quite inappropriate to
speak of love for the object of search, not just because the searchers, we
may suppose, had not even heard of the convicts before, but also because
they would be more likely to be motivated in their search by fear than by
love. Although Augustine does not discuss this kind of case, we can imag-
ine that he might respond by saying that, although he had meant to be
focusing on positive searches, rather than negative ones, it would da no
serious harm to the major points he wants to make to weaken the
Motivational Assumption to something more like this:
1.* S won't search for 0 unless S in some way cares about o.
Let's suppose for present purposes that such a response would be satis-
factory and turn our attention to another sort of objection. Whatever exact-
ly the motivating attitude of the searchers for my little brother might have
been - whether it was love or fear or something else - the searchers need-
n't have known my brother to have had that attitude toward hin'l. Nor
need they have known him or his friend to be able to search for them. A
general description of at least one of the two boys, or perhaps a picture,
would have served quite wen to target the search. This consideration
brings us back to Augustine's own discussion. Augustine devotes the first
four sections of De trinitate X to considering a variety of cases in which one
could be said to care enough about the object of inquiry to search for it,
even though one could not be said to know it, at least in any strong sense
of'know.'
The first kind of case Augustine brings up is one in which some student
already knows the beauties of bodies generally from having seen many of
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them. Incited by the reputation for beauty of an as yet unseen body, the stu-
dent longs to find it. In this case, Augustine says, because the genus of the
thing sought is already known, love is aroused for "a thing not entirely
unknown" (non rei penitus incognitae amor excitatur - 10.1.1). In honor of my
wife, who is an ardent birdwatcher, I propose to call the model of inquiry
Augustine suggests with this first example the Birder Model. When my wife
goes out to look for birds in a new location she may want to add a bird
species or variety to her "life list." That is, she may hope to see a kind of bird
she has never seen before. She already knows the genus,3 bird, very weIl. In
fact she knows many species, subspecies, and varieties of that genus and
loves them with a great and tender affection. Maybe she has heard that
there were birds of some, to her, completely unfamiliar species in this new
location. Her love of the genus leads her to seek the new species.
Altematively, my wife might simply want to make up a day list, that is,
see individuals of some of the species that are already familiar to her. No
doubt the individual birds she sees will be individuals she has never seen
before; bllt the type will be familiar and wellloved.
A few lines later in De trinitate X Augustine suggests a second model of
inquiry. His example this time is learning how to write. He imagines some-
one who has never before realized that it is possible to communicate one's
thoughts to a distant recipient by writing them down and sending the writ-
ten message to the distant party. The inquirer will be motivated to learn,
Augustine supposes, not by loving the skill of writing, which is still
unknown to him, but by loving the pllrpose or end. The model of inquiry
that lies behind this example is something we could call the Teleological
Model. One knows and loves the end or purpose to be served. One seeks to
learn and master a skill that will fulfill or serve that end or purpose.
In the next section Augustine imagines someone coming across a new
word. Augustine's example is temetum, which means 'wine.' Augustine
imagines that one might recognize that temetum is a sign, that is, a mean-
ingful word, bllt not know its meaning, its significatum. Augustine
describes this as a case in which the sign is known, but "not fully known"
(non plene notum est - 10.1.2.42). The mind, he says, wants to know the rest
(quod reliquum est - 10.1.2.43) A little later he says the mind wants to know
the sign perfectly (perfecte id nosse vult - 10.1.2.47). I shall call the model of
inquiry suggested here the Perfeetion Model. According to the Perfection
Model of Inquiry one loves something one knows only imperfectly. By
inquiry one seeks to know it more nearly perfectly.
A few lines later Augustine uses the Perfection Model in a grander way.
He says that the soul may see in the light of truth how great and how good
it is to understand and speak the languages of all peoples. The glory (decus)
of such knowledge is seen in thought, he says. Motivated by the love of it,
one seeks to perfect that knowledge in oneself. Learning the meaning of
'terneturn' is thus a small step toward perfecting the art of communication,
which one already know and loves.
With these three models of inquiry in play - the Birder Model, the
Teleological Model, and the Perfeetion Model- Augustine can aSSLIre us, at
the beginning of DT 10.1.3, that the motivating love of "a mind that wants
to know what it does not know, is not the love of the thing it does not
THE MIND'S SEARCH FOR ITSELF 419
know, but rather the love of that which it does know, on account of which
it wishes to know what it does not know." We can also put Augustine's
point less paradoxically. In a way, perhaps, the mind does know and love
what it seeks. On the Birder Model it knows the object of the search as
either a new species of the already known and loved genus, or else as a
new individual under an already known and loved species. On the
Teleological Model the mind knows the object as whatever will serve the
known and valued purpose or end. On the Perfection Model it knows the
object directly, perhaps through the senses, perhaps in the light of truth;
but it knows this object only imperfectly, or partially.
In Section 3 Augustine distinguishes between the merely curious per-
son, the curiosus, and the studiosus, the genuine student. The curiosus is a
collector of information. For someone like that amassing information is
indiscriminate. Today such a person would count as a trivia buffo What
motivates inquiry for such people is not the love of what is unknown; it is
the love of knowing. And so this case falls under the Perfection Model. The
curiosus knows and loves knowing and wants to know it more perfectly,
that is, more completely.
In DT 10.2.4 Augustine describes yet another possibility. It is the case of
someone hearing something praised who, from the description provided
by the person praising it, forms an image of the object to be searched for. I
shall call the model of inquiry suggested by these remarks the Projection
Model. Augustine makes it clear that it is not the image itself that one
knows and loves. For he allows that one may be disappointed when one
encounters the actual person or thing one's image was supposed to repre-
sent. Thus, when those who had praised the object confirm that this thing
before me is the very thing they had praised, on the basis of which I had
made up my image, I may be disappointed to find that the object before me
is not at all attractive in the way that the object I had projected was.
Each of these four models gives us a way of rejecting the Knowledge
Requirement, or, perhaps better, weakening and qualifying it. Thus if the
Knowledge Requirement is weakened to this, it is acceptable:
2.* S can't love 0 unless S knows 0 at least indirectly, or partially,
or by description.
But then watering down the knowledge requirement to allow for partial,
or indirect, knowledge, as weIl as for knowledge by description, forces us
to transform something that indeed had the look of a truism, namely,
3. If S already knows 0, then S can't search for 0 [because S does not
lack knowledge of 0]
into
3.* If S already knows 0 at least indirectly, or partially, or by
description, then
S can't search for 0 [because S does not lack knowledge of 0]
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which, far from being a truism, is simply false. One can certainly lack
knowledge of what one knows indirectly, or partially, or by description..
What Augustine's various models of inquiry bring out are thus some of
the ways that indirect or partial knowledge, or mere knowledge by
description, not only leaves something to search for, or inquire about, but
also helps direct or aim the inquiry at its object.
If we turn back for a moment to the original Paradox of Inquiry in
Plato's dialogue, Meno, we can recall that two reasons are offered there for
saying that, if, for example, one doesn't know virtue, one can't search for it.
One reason is what we might call the Targeting Objection ("How will you
aim your search for something you do not know at all?" Meno 80d6-7); and
the other is the Recognition Objection ("If you should meet with it, how will
you know that this is the thing that you did not know?" d7-8) The general
description of the object of inquiry generated by each of the four models of
inquiry presented by Augustine in DT 10 suggests a way of responding
effectively to both the Targeting Objection and the Recognition Objection.
The partial or indirect knowledge, or knowledge by description, that these
models allow for may be sufficient both for aiming the search satisfactorily
and for enabling the searcher to recognize the object, once it is encoun-
tered, as weIl.
* * *
Augustine next turns to see if the problem of motivated inquiry may be
significantly different when what the mind desires is to know is itself. (cum
se ipsa mens nosse desiderat 10.2.4) Only hinted at in the beginning of
Augustine's discussion, but fully acknowledged later on, is the use
Augustine wants to make of the admonition, 'Know thyself!' Augustine
Llnderstands this command to be an admonition directed to the mind to
know itself. Incidentally, Augustine doesn't ever say why 'Know thyself!'
should be understood to be aimed at the mind in particular. But Cicero, in
his first Tusculan Disputation, which Augustine must have had freshly in
his mind when he wrote De trinitate X, does discuss the issue briefly. "For I
do not believe," writes Cicero of the maxim, 'Know thyself!"
that it instructs us to know the members of our body, or our stahlre,
or our shape; nor are we our bodies, nor do I, saying this to you,
speak to your body. Thus when [Apollo] says, "Know yourself!" he
means this: "Know your mind [animus]!" (1.22.52, trans. mine)
So Augustine's question now is, how can the mind be coherently supposed
to want to know itself?
In tackling this issue Augustine first tries OLlt the Projection Model.
Perhaps, he suggests, it is not that the mind loves itself and wants to get to
know itself, bLlt rather, perhaps, what the mind loves is what it has formed
an image of, which could be something quite different. (10.3.5.8) But where
would it get the materials for this image of itself? Perhaps, Augustine sug-
gests, the mind already has, from its knowledge of other minds, a generic
image of mind and so already knows itself generically at least (genere ipso
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sibi nota est -10.3.5.11) The attentive reader of De trinitate will remember,
however, that Augustine had already considered and rejected in Book VIII
the idea that one might abstract a generic idea of mind by comparing sev-
eral other minds and extracting what they have in common. He had reject-
ed that idea in his discussion of the Argument from Analogy for Other
Minds. There he had insisted that we cannot know other minds directly
and so cannot compare them in such a way as to be able to form a generic
image of them. Here, in Book X, he simply insists that, since "nothing
could be more present to itself than itself" (10.3.5.13-14) the idea of using a
generic image to recognize what one's own rnind is, is inappropriate.
He turns next to the Teleological Model. Perhaps, he suggests, the mind
can see in the reason of etemal truth how beautiful it is to know itself and it
seeks to realize that end. (10.3.5.18-21) Or, again, perhaps it sees some end
that includes its own safety and beatitude and believes that it cannot
achieve this end without self-knowledge. Or, and now he brings the figure
of the curiosus and the Perfection Model of Inquiry into play, perhaps the
mind just loves knowing, and knowing itself turns out to be one of the
ways the mind can gain more nearly perfect knowledge.
So far Augustine has not found any of the models of inqtliry he had
developed earlier in the book helpful in understanding how the mind can
direct its inquiry at itself. At this point he decides to short-circuit the
review of models of inquiry he had developed in earlier sections. He does
so by presenting reasoning for the conclusion that the mind, even in seek-
ing to know itself, already knows itself.
I should say right away that the expression Iknows itself' in the phrase
Ithe mind knows itself' is not as clear as one could wish. To figure out what
Augustine means by it we need to reflect on passages like this one:
However, [the mind] knows what knowing iso And, so long as it
loves this thing that it knows [namely, what knowing is], it wants to
know itself as weIl. In what place, then, does it know its own know-
ing, if it does not [even] know itself? For it knows that it knows other
things, but [on the hypothesis we are considering] not that it knows
itself. To be sure, it is on account of [knowing that it knows other
things] that it also knows what knowing iso By what means, then,
does the very thing that does not know itself [nevertheless] know
itself knowing something? Nor [in this case] does it know another
mind knowing [something], but it itself. Therefore, it knows it itself.
(10.3.5.33-39)4
At least part of Augustine's idea in this rather tortured bit of reasoning
seems to be this. The mind knows that it knows something. The rnind also
recognizes that its knowing something is different from another mind's
knowing something. So the rnind recognizes itself and realizes that it is dif-
ferent from other minds. I suggest, in fact, that what Augustine means by
Ithe mind knows itself' is that very thing, namely, the mind recognizes itself
and realizes that it is different from other minds.
If I have put the right gloss on Ithe mind knows itself,' then the principle
Augustine rnight be said to be appealing to in the last quoted passage is this:
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(P) For any x such that x is an F, if x knows that it knows something
and knows that its knowing something is different from other Fs
knowing the same thing, then x knows itself, in the sense of recogniz-
ing itself and distinguishing itself from other Fs.
Thus even before my mind seeks to know itself, it knows that it knows
something, say, the 12-times table, and it knows that its knowing the 12-
times table is different from another mind's knowing that very thing. Thus,
by (P), before my mind seeks to know itself it already knows itself in the
sense of at least recognizing itself and distinguishing itself from other
minds.
Now we understand why Augustine decided to short-circuit the review
of models of inquiry he had developed earlier. Instead of asking how it is
possible to conduct a motivated search for what one only partially or indi-
rectly knows, or knows only by description, Augustine is now interested in
asking how it is possible to conduct a motivated search for what one
already knows, in the sense of being able to recognize it and distinguish it
from other members of its kinde Thus, the discussion so far has focused on
ways of weakening or watering down the Knowledge Requirement suffi-
ciently to make room for inquiry by making clear how (a) indirect or (b)
partial knowledge, or (c) knowledge by description, could be used to aim
or direct the inquiry and, at the same time, leave room for something to be
gained by inquiry When Augustine turns his attention to the case of the
mind's searching for or seeking itself, however, he does not want to say
that the mind knows itself only indirectly, or only by description.
Augustine certainly doesn't want to say that the mind has only indirect
knowledge of itself. One of his mantras in this seetion of the De trinitate, as
we shall see, is "Nothing is more present to the mind than itself." So it
would be wrong to say that the mind has only indirect knowledge of itself
and seeks to know itself directly.
He is not happy with saying that the mind knows itself only partially
either. Here is a sampie of his ruminations on that point:
And if [the mind] knows what it seeks, and seeks itself, it certainly
knows itself. What then should it still seek? But if it knows itself in
part, yet still seeks itself in part, then it does not seek itself, but [onlyl
apart of itself. (DT 10.4.6)
5uppose the mind were made up, as Freud thought, of ego, superego
and id. And suppose my mind knew only the part that is the ego. Then it
would think of itself merely as ego. In seeking to know what it took to be
itself, it would not really be seeking to know itself, but only part of itself,
namely, its ego. That seems to be Augustine's worry when he rejects the
idea that the mind that is inquiring into itself might begin with only partial
knowledge of itself.
As you might already guess, Augustine also rejects the idea that the
mind might know itself only by description. I'm going to say a little more
about his rejection of that in a moment. But, for now, it will be enough to
appeal to the aforementioned mantra, 'Nothing is more present to the
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mind than itself,' as a way of discrediting the suggestion that the mind
knows itself only by description.
Still, Augustine needs to make some "wiggle room" for the possible
fruits of inquiry. That is, Augustine needs to understand how the knowl-
edge that the mind has of itself is both sufftcient to target successfully its
inquiry into itself and also limited enough to give scope to the inquiry, that
is, room for the mind to gain new knowledge about itself. Here is a passage
in which Augustine seeks to identify the needed "wiggle room":
Let the mind, therefore, know itself, and not seek itself as though it were
absent; let it fix the attention of its will, by which it formerly wandered
over many things, upon itself, and think of itself. So it will see that there
was never a time when it did not love itself, and never a time when it did
not know itself; but because it loved another thing with itself, it has con-
fused itself with this other thing, and has, in a certain way, grown together
with it. And so while it embraces diverse things as though they were one, it
came to regard as one, things that are diverse. (DT 10.8.11)
Augustine's suggestion is now that the mind, though it knows itself and
is fully present to itself, has confused itself with something else. How can
this happen? Augustine's idea seems to be that, by focusing all its attention
on the sensory world, plus images of the sensory world, the mind comes
to think of itself as something that could also be represented by a bodily
image, and hence as something corporeal. "However, the mind errs," he
writes,
when it so lovingly and intimately connects itself with these images,
as even to consider itself to be something of the same kind [as the
things those images represent]. For so it is conformed to them to
some extent, ... not by thinking itself to be an image, but that very
thing itself of which it has an image. (10.6.8)
The difficulty, as Augustine sees it, lies in the fact that the mind tries to
represent itself to itself, as though it were something distinct from itself.
Instead of recognizing that it is nonrepresentationally present to itself, the
mind gets so caught up in corporeal images that it tries to represent itself to
itself in yet another corporeal image.
The central claim that dominates the discussion in this part of DT 10 is
what I shall call the Presence Principle: Nothing is more present to the mind
than the mind is present to itself. What does tllis mean? In particular, what
does Augustine here mean by 'presence" (praesens)? One thing that 'present'
means is 'not absent.' The mind, Augustine writes, is in no way absent to
itself, or remote from itself. (DT 10.8.11) That seems to mean, for one thing,
that the mind is fully available to itself. Thus, even if the mind hasn't consid-
ered properly what it itself is, or if, through the plausibility of the mistaken
metaphysical principle that all substances are corporeal, it has confused itself
about what it is, the mind is nevertheless totally available to itself for the self-
identification of its substance or nature. It needs no information from "else-
where," or from "outside" - from, for example, some experiment or from
some outside expert or some recondite reasoning - to get clear about what
it itself iso It needs only to reflect on what it finds itself to be.
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To get a better grasp of what the Presence Principle means for
Augustine we need to remind ourselves of the variety of ways individual
things can, according to Augustine, be present to the mind:
1. A physical object can be present to my mind through the bodily
senses. Thus when I see the tree in front of me, that tree is pre-
sent to my mind through vision.
2. A physical object can be present to my mind through a repre-
sentation of it in my mind. This kind of case divides into two:
a. Suppose I entertain a memory image of a tree I have seen..
Then the tree that is present to my mind through its image
is the tree I have seen.
b. Alternatively, the image in my mind may be one I have
made up to represent either something generic, say, a
generic tree, or else a particular individual, say, a tree that
I have not seen, but have had described to me.
3. The mind is present to itself, not through an image or other rep-
resentation, but simply through itself.
When Augustine says that nothing is more present to the mind than the
mind is to itself, part of what he wants to emphasize is that the mind is pre-
sent to itself immediately, that is, without the mediation of anything else.
Thus when I see a tree in front of me, the tree is present to my mind
through the mediation of my sight. When I remember the tree I saw yester-
day, that tree is present to my mind through the mediation of a memory
image. When someone describes a tree to me that I have never seen, that
tree becomes present to my mind through the mediation of an image the
mind forms within itself on the basis of the description. But when I turn
my attention to my own mind, my mind is present to itself without any
mediation whatsoever - specifically, without the mediation of my senses
and without the mediation of any mental image or other representation.
The mind is thus present to itself immediately and non-representationally.
Nothing, Augustine supposes, can be more present to the mind than some-
thing that is thus present to it immediately and non-representationally.
This idea that the mind is present to itself non-representationally plays a
role in one of Augustine's arguments for saying that the mind is incorpore-
al. Suppose the mind were something corporeal, for example, suppose it
were the brain. Then, for the mind to be able to think of itself it would have
to be possible for the brain to be present to the mind nonrepresentationally.
The mind would, as Augustine puts it,
think of this thing [that is, the brain] in a different way from [the way
in which it thinks of] otl'ler [material] things, not, namely, through an
image figment (non scilicet per imaginale figmentum), in the way that
absent things touched by a sense of the body are brought to mind ...
not Dust] by a mock-up (simulata) but rather by [its] inner presence.
For there is nothing more present to [the mind] than itself. {DT
10.10.16)5
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Yet there is no way, Augustine insists, that the brain or any other mater-
ial thing can be present to the mind immediately and non-representational-
ly, the way the mind can be present to itself. So the mind is not the brain,
or anything material.6
The Presence Principle not only gives Augustine a way of arguing for
the immateriality of the mind, it also gives hirn a way of understanding
how the mind, though it already knows itself, can still seek itself. The
mind's seeking itself can consist in the mind's redirecting its attention to
itself and away from the things tl1at have distracted it.
What can the mind hope to discover about itself, once it has directed its
attention to itself and away from the physical objects that have distracted
it? We might have expected Augustine to describe for us the contents of his
own consciousness, or some introspected "innermost self." In fact,
Augustine offers no introspective revelations.
Instead, what Augustine focuses on are things the mind cannot doubt
about itself. The mind may have never stopped to consider these truths
about itself. But once it considers them, it realizes that it cannot doubt them.
Things that the mind cannot doubt about itself, according to Augustine,
include these: that it lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows,
and judges. "Yet who would doubt that he lives, remerrLbers, understands,
wills, thinks, knows, and judges?" Augustine asks rhetorically. The implica-
tion is clearly that no one can doubt these truths, not even one who suppos-
es, mistakenly, that the mind is something material.
For even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he
doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wish-
es to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does
not know; if he doubts he judges that he ought not to consent rashly.
Whoever then doubts about anything else ought never to doubt about all
of these; for if they were not, he would be unable to doubt about anything
at all. (DT 10.10.14)
After telling us that the mind is certain of its own nature (substantia),
Augustine adds, in a grand rhetorical flourish, that the mind "should be
certain that it is none of the things about which it is uncertain, and it
should be certain that it is that alone which alone it is certain that it is."
(DT 10.10.16) Augustine's inquiry into the nature or substance of the mind
thus yields this result:
(M) The mind is something whose nature it is to be only what it is
certain that it iso
It is well to note that Augustine in his essential characterization of mind
fails to include anything about the mind's being "transparent" to itself, in
the familiar sense of its being necessarily aware of all its contents. Thus
there is here nothing in De trinitate X comparable to this famous claim of
Descartes: "As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as
it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self-
evident."7 Descartes's idea seems to be that, if there is a pain or an appear-
ance of redness in my mind, necessarily my mind is aware of it. We might
have expected Augustine to make a similar claim, but he does not.
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Moreover, Augustine's characterization of the mind as something that
lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges - though
otherwise quite similar to Descartes's - leaves out the last two items from
Descartes's list, namely, "also imagines and has sensory perceptions.//8
Why should this be so?
The mental functions Augustine appeals to, to characterize the nature of
the mind are all features Augustine considers to be immune to doubt by being
themselves guaranteed by doubt. Thus if one doubts, it follows that one lives
(in at least the sense of surviving). Again, if one succeeds in doubting
something, then one understands that one doubts, indeed, according to
Augustine, understands what it is that one doubts. By contrast, if one
doubts something, it does not follow that one has any sensory perceptions
at all, or that one imagines anything at alle So having sense perceptions
and imagining things does not belong essentially to that, as one might call
it, "core self// Augustine calls "the mind.// In this respect, Augustine's con-
ception of the mind is a purer conception of a thinking thing than
Descartes's. Imagining things and having sensory perceptions are, by
implication, not essential but only accidental to the mind.
To make a little clearer what a mind is, according to Augustine, I want
to develop a thought experiment. My thought experiment is inspired by9
this admonition from Augustine:
But since we are investigating the nature of the mind [natura mentis],
let us not take into consideration any knowledge that is obtained
from without through the senses of the body, and consider more
attentively those things which we have laid down that all minds
know and are certain of concerning them themselves. (DT 10.10.14)10
Here is the thought experiment. Suppose I am in a bad automobile acci-
dent, after which I seem to wake up in an odd state with little or no sensory
input. I cannot see or hear anything. I seem to be paralyzed. I have only
minimal kinesthetic sensations. Am I in a hospital recovering from the acci-
dent? Or have I, as I might SLIppose, survived death? In this immobilized
state I might think of myself as an academic who once taught philosophy at
UMass, as the husband of Mary Howorth, as the father of Sarah, Becca, and
lohn. But, in my present state, whatever exactly it is, I might be mistaken
about any or all of these descriptions without putting in jeopardy my claim
to know that it is I who have come to consciousness. So who is this 'I' who
has come to consciousness? Perhaps all I can be certain of concerning my
identity is, in fact, that it's me. It is I who am alive, thank God - if not bio-
logically alive, at least alive in the sense that goes with wondering whether
there is life after death. In this sense I live, and, of course, I think, I know
that I live and think, I want to know more about my condition and I know
that I want that. I judge that I am conscious and know this as weIl. Do I real-
ly remember anything? I seem to. But of all the items on Augustine's list of
certainties that the mind enjoys, remembering is, no doubt, the most ques-
tionable. Still, if we understand 'remember' in the weak sense of 'seem to
remember,' there is no problem about including it as weIl.
The self-isolation portrayed in this thought experiment helps us pick
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out, I think, the core self that Augustine in his De trinitate calls mens, "the
mind." In the imagined circumstance this core self would be, in
Augustine's expression, "present" to me without my needing to pick it out
from other entities, and without my having to represent it to myself by
either amental picture or some definite description, such as, 'the husband
of Mary Howorth .' I would be infallibly present to myself even if, for any
such description I might come up with for myself, that description were, in
fact, mistaken.
So understood, this mind is not, it can seem plausible to say, a brain, or
anything material. That is, when I say, "Thank God I still exist," I need not
mean to be expressing any gratitude for the functional preservation of my
body, even my brain. It would be coherent for me to at least wonder
whether I had survived my bodily death.
Could my mind function without its being embodied in some brain or
other, or at least in some brainlike structure? I don't know. For all I know, I
might have to have a brain. For all I know, the waking-up experience I
have described in my thought experiment, though conceivable as an after-
death experience without any physical basis in a human brain, is, in actual-
ity, physically impossible.
Augustine, of course, accepted the Christian doctrine of the resurrection
of the body. Although, on occasion, he expressed some puzzlement as to
why we need a body in the afterlife, he, unlike, say, Descartes, seems to
have had no philosophical or theological interest in trying to show that the
core self, the mind, could actually function in a disembodied state. In prov-
ing, as he thinks he has done in De trinitate X, that the mind or inner self is
nothing corporeal, he seems not to have thought of hirnself as proving that
the mind could think without its having even a resurrection body.
Why might there be such a big difference as this between Augustine
and Descartes? I think the answer is, first, that Augustine is not a founda-
tionalist in epistemology. Thus, although he argues for ms own existence in
a cogito-like fashion as a response to global skepticism, he does not make '1
am' or 'I think, therefore 1 am' a foundation stone for knowledge.9 It was
for mm a sufficient reply to global skepticism, but not the basis for every
other knowledge claim he thought he was entitled to make..
Second, Augustine never seriously doubts the existence of "the extemal
world." There is an intriguing passage in ms Contra academicos, the earliest
work of his that is extant, in wmch he considers withholding assent from
the assumption that there is an independent physical world.12 But this
suggestion does not lead him to any further thoughts. And this idea seems
to play no role at all in his later thought.
Augustine did try to face what I have called "the epistemological dream
problem" (/How do I know whether I am now dreaming?'),13 but he seems
not to have conceived "the metaphysical dream problem" (/How do I
know that not everything is my dream?').14 Thus he didn't reason from the
certainty of his own existence plus the possibility of there being no "exter-
nal world" to the conclusion that the mind could exist in a completely dis-
embodied state.
* * *
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Augustine's concludes that mind (mens) - what I have called one's "core
self" - is something whose nature it is to be only what it is certain that it iso
This conclusion is, of course, the fruit of inquiry. But what is the nature of that
inquiry, and how is an inquiry by the mind into the nature of mind possible?
As we have already seen, Augustine rejects the idea that the mind's
search to know itself can be said to be directed by (a) partial knowledge, or
(b) indirect knowledge, or by (c) knowledge by description. Th.e mind, he
thinks, is immediately available to itself, that is, the mind knows and rec-
ognizes itself as itself without having to use any kind of mediation -
whether sense perception or sense image, or description.
Augustine already available a model of inquiry with which to under-
stand the mind's inquiry into itself. It is the Perfeetion Model. Thus at the
beginning of the inquiry into itself the mind already knows itself, but it
wants to perfeet its knowledge of itself. It must, however, resist the inclina-
tion to think of the imperfect knowledge that it already has of itself as par-
tial knowledge. For that might lead it, wrongly, to suppose that it knows
only apart of itself, whereas what is present to itself, without the media-
tion of the senses or any sort of representation, is itself as a whole.
The object of the mind's inquiry into itself can be successfully targeted by
its realization that it is immediately present to itself and that it can recognize
itself in, for example, knowing that it lives, that it thinks, and so on, without
the mediation of sense perception, or of a memory image, or of any mental
self-representation at all. Having targeted itself in this way as someth.ing
immediately present to itself, it can come to realize, on reflection, that it can-
not doubt that it lives, remembers, understands, wills, trunks, knows, and
judges and that it is, therefore, a being that lives, remembers, understands,
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